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This  article  analyzes  the  effects  of  international  trade  policies  on  an  imperfect 
competitive domestic market, taking into account not only consumers but also upstream and 
downstream firms. We first study the impact of a classic import tax decrease and we find that 
upstream firms are harmed and domestic fiscal revenues may decrease with such a policy. We 
then  look  at  the  effect  of  an  increase  in  non-tariff  barriers,  seen  as  the  lowest  degree  of 
substitutability  between  the  domestic  good  and  the  imported  good.  The  result  is  an 
improvement in each agent’s situation, since international competition becomes less fierce. 
Last,  we  show  that  market  conditions  may  exist  such  that  a  coupled  policy  (import  tax 
decrease and non-tariff barrier increase) makes every agent better off. This can explain why 
we observe a proliferation of domestic standards at national level in order to back up lower 
tariff negotiations by governments. 
 
JEL Classification: L14; F12; L20; F13.  
 






  Over the last few decades we have observed two developments in trade policy that at 
first sight seem contradictory to the goals assigned to the World Trade Organization (see 
WTO, [13]). According to Yu [14]: 
 
“One of the most striking features of the trade policies of many industrialized nations is 
the apparent substitution of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) for tariffs. During the past three decades, 
tariffs have undergone continuous reduction while, at the same time, various NTBs have been 
adopted.” 
 
Indeed, Beghin [3] obverses lower tariffs (3% in high-income countries) on the one 
hand whereas there is a proliferation of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on the other. Common 
NTBs  include  market-specific  trade  and  domestic  policies  such  as  rules  of  origin  and 
domestic content requirement schemes (for example labeling and certification policies such as 
the European Union Geographic Indication system) that are specifically classified as technical 
barriers  to  trade  (TBT).  Labeling  that  communicates  the  origin  of  products  is  becoming 
prominent in the agrofood sector (Anders and Caswell, [1]). 
The use of NTBs, other than quantity-price controls and finance measures, increased 
from 55% of all NTB measures in 1994 to 85% in 2004. The use of TBTs almost doubled, 
from 32% to 59% of affected tariff lines over the same period (Beghin, [4]). The evolution of 
the NTBs is more qualitative because it is difficult to translate its effects in terms of tax 
equivalent. It is indeed crucial to assess welfare losses imputable to implementation of NTBs. 
For this reason, the OECD [8] discussed the different methods that have been used to quantify 
the impact of product standards on trade, and more precisely on welfare. 
 
The general opinion about trade policy is that the decrease in tariffs has led to more 
exchanges between countries, and has thus improved social welfare. This is based on the 
classic  Ricardo  and  Hecksher-Ohlin  models  which  assume  perfect  competition  in  both 
countries trading their goods. However, it is important to relax this assumption and analyze 
the trade policy reform taking into account imperfect competition as well as market structure. 
According to Krugman-Obstfled [5], governments prefer to negotiate tariff decreases rather 
than non-tariff decreases. This suggests that their effects are not the same on the domestic 
economy, notably on agent’s surplus. 
  The  second  point  is  that  imperfect  competition  has  an  impact  on  trade  policy 
implementation. Regarding vertical structures (upstream and downstream firms), economic 
analysis  has  focused  on  the  foreclosure  issue.  Domestic  upstream  firms  can  evict  new 
suppliers  coming  from  abroad  by  adapting  their  contracts  with  the  downstream  firms, 
especially when local anti-trust authorities are lenient, as in Avenel & Barlet [2]  or Spencer 
& Jones [11, 12]. 
 
  In this article, we focus on the effect of trade policy reform, taking into account a 
simple vertical structure composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. In order to analyze trade 
policy correctly, tariff and non-tariff barriers are disentangled. The tariff is assumed to be an 
import tax rate that the retailer pays when he buys from the World Market, whereas we model 
the non-tariff barriers as a proxy for the degree of substitutability between the domestic good 
and the imported good. 
 
We first find that a trade reform only aimed at decreasing the import tax rate is not 
accepted by all agents, especially upstream firms. However, any increase in NTBs is accepted 3 
by everyone since domestic competition between goods is reduced. The main conclusion is 
that an implementation of NTBs can overcome the reluctance of agents harmed by a lower 
tariff,  so  that  everyone  is  better  off.  This  can  explain  stylized  facts  where  we  observe  a 
proliferation of domestic standards (TBTs) at national level in order to back up lower tariffs 
resulting from governments’ negotiations. 
  Our article is a positive economic paper in the sense that it tries to explain the conflicts 
of interests in a simple economy that arises from the trade policy reform, distinguishing trade 
obstacles  by  nature  (tariff  barriers  and  non-tariff  barriers)  as  well  as  market  structure 
complexity (upstream and downstream conflict of interests). 
 
  Section 2 presents the framework we use to analyze the trade policy reform. Section 3 
exhibits  the  market  equilibrium  with  a  producer-retailer  vertical  structure  and  section  4 
analyzes the consequence of various trade policy reforms. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. The framework 
 
We  consider  a  vertical  structure  composed  of  a  manufacturer  and  a  retailer. 
Manufacturer   produces a good domestically with a quadratic cost function:  ( ) =
 
   , 
where q is the quantity level and c a cost parameter. His production can be sold on two 
markets. First, he sells part of his production (q
D) to a domestic retailer  .
1 The retailer incurs 
no cost for his activities and sells the good to final consumers at price   . We assume a two-
part tariff contract between the manufacturer and the retailer, where the wholesale price    
and the franchise fee    are fixed according to a Nash Axiomatic framework.
2 The parameter 
  denotes the manufacturer’s bargaining power, and (1 −  ) that of the retailer. Second, the 
manufacturer  can  also  sell  part  of  his  production  (  )  on  the  "World  Market".  This 
supranational  market  is  assumed  to  be  perfectly  competitive.  This  implies  that  the 
manufacturer  is  anonymous  on  this  market  and  not  big  enough  to  influence  the  World 
equilibrium price. He therefore acts as a price-taker agent. In this framework, we suppose 
there are no exportation taxes. Assuming the world price is exogenous and equal to  , the 
manufacturer can export as many quantities as he wants (completely inelastic world demand); 
his revenues will thus be   ⋅   .  
  In the same way, the retailer has two supply sources. He can either buy  from the 
domestic manufacturer, paying him the unit wholesale price   and the franchise fee   , or 
buy from the World market at the unit price  . When importing, the retailer faces an ad-
valorem import tax set to   by the domestic State. Therefore, the final unit price paid by the 
retailer to import is  (1 +  ). The price charged to the consumers for the imported good is   .  
  Consumers  do  not  consider  the  domestic  good  and  the  imported  good  as  perfect 
substitutes. This can be justified by the fact that when the good is sold by the retailer from the 
manufacturer’s  domestic  production,  it  can  fulfill  domestic  standard  requirements  and  be 
labeled differently from the imported good.
3 Because the World market is supplied by many 
countries,  the  imported  product  may  differ  from  the  domestic  good.  The  label  allows 
consumers to distinguish the imported good from the domestic one. 
                                                 
1 All variables relative to the domestic market will be denoted with a D superscript, the ones relative to the imported good 
will be denoted with the I subscript, and X will denote the variable relative to the exportation. 
2 See the book by Osborne & Rubinstein [9] for a detailed presentation of the Nash negotiation game and its topological 
characteristics. 
3 The cost of presenting the domestic production to the Domestic Standard Agency delivering the label is not formalized. 4 
 
Demands  for  the  domestic  good  (denoted  q (p ,p ))  and  for  the  imported  good 
(denoted q (p ,p )) are derived from a quasi-linear and quadratic utility of a representative 
consumer.
4 They are given by:  
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  The parameter   is a measure of the market size for the total demand.
 5 The parameter 
  summarizes the NTBs by reflecting the degree of differentiation between the two goods: 
when   → 0, goods are independent: the demand for the domestic good (resp. imported good) 
depends  only  on  its  own  price,  and  when    → 1  goods  tend  to  be  considered  as  perfect 
substitutes  by  consumers.
6  This  parameter  can  also  be  interpreted  as  the  strength  of  the 
standard for consumers. If the standard obtained by the domestic good is not relevant for 
consumers,  they  will  consider  the  two  goods  as  close  substitutes.  Conversely,  when 
consumers care about the domestic label, the two goods are independent. One can also think 
of compatibility issues where the domestic good and the imported good may not be fully 
compatible to be used on a given device (see Régibeau and Rocketty, [10]). 
 
The framework is summarized in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: The economic framework with vertical structure. 
 
We now turn to the negotiation process and solve the equilibrium wholesale price and 
franchise fee between the manufacturer and the retailer.  
 
 
                                                 
4  The  consumer’s  utility  function  is  assumed  to  take  the  form:  U q ,q ,q      1   α q   	 1   α q   
 
 	 q  
  βq q   	q  
    q  
where q  is the Hicksian composite commodity with a price normalized to 1. 
5 The interpretation of α as the market size parameter in the comparative static analysis has to be considered for a given level 
of β, see Irmen [6] for more details. 
6 For example, country-of-origin labeling (COOL) is a horizontal product characteristic. 
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3. Market equilibrium with the vertical structure 
 
The  manufacturer  and  the  retailer  negotiate  the  level  of  the  domestic  product’s 
wholesale price and the associated franchise fee. As we assumed this negotiation was taking 
place according to a Nash Axiomatic framework, we first need to consider the disagreement 
equilibrium. It constitutes the threat points of the negotiation and gives the profit each agent 
will make if the negotiation on the domestic product fails.  
   
We first define each agent’s reservation profit in the case where the manufacturer and 
the retailer do not reach an agreement (see Appendix A for more details of the resolution). 
The manufacturer sells all his production to the World market (pure exportations) while the 
retailer  buys  exclusively  from  the  World  market  and  pays  import  tariff.  The  reservation 
profits are: 
(2)   
   =
  
  
   =
1
4(1 +   −  (1 +  ))2
 
 
We now turn to the case where the retailer and the manufacturer negotiate in order to 
find  an  agreement  for  selling  the  domestic  product.  The  gross  surplus  (GS)  of  the  two 
products is thus defined by (see Appendix B for more details of the resolution):  
(3)    ( , ) = (   −  (1 +  )) ⋅   (  ,  ) +    ⋅   (  ,  ) +   ⋅    −  
(     (  ,  )) 
   
 
The net surplus (  ) necessary to find an agreement takes into account each firm’s 
threat point, that is:  
(4)    ∗( , ) =   ( , ) −    −    =
((   )(   )  (   )   ) 
 (    ) > 0 
 
The wholesale price is set to the equilibrium marginal cost   ∗ =   and the franchise 
fee is only used to split the net surplus between each agent according to their bargaining 
power parameter: πM*(β,t)=γ⋅NS*(β,t)+πM and πR*(β,t)=(1-γ)⋅NS*(β,t)+πR.  
At the end, each one gets:  
(5)           
  ∗( , ) =  
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The equilibrium outcome values for prices are:  
(6)   
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The equilibrium outcome values in quantities are:  
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 6 
The domestic government, when both goods are sold, benefits from fiscal revenues 
up-to:  
(8)   ∗( , ) =     ∗(  ∗) =
  [(   )(   )  (     )]
 (    )  
 
The first remark concerns the fiscal revenues of the domestic government. The import 
tax needs to be not too high in order to have positive fiscal revenues. The limit tax value is 
thus defined by:
7  
(9)                
∗( , ) = 0 ⇒  ( ) =
(1+ − )(1− )
  > 0 
The second remark is that the domestic sales are greater than the imported ones. This 
is quite trivial as the retailer pays   ∗ =   for each domestic unit whereas he pays  (1 +  ) 
for the imported ones.  
  The third remark is that the total quantity  produced by the manufacturer does not 
depend on the import taxes: q ∗ + q ∗ =
 
 . This is due to the equilibrium wholesale price set 
to   ∗ =  . The manufacturer earns the same unit revenue from export and from domestic 
sales. Therefore, the total quantity produced is decided according to marginal cost, which 
depends on the opportunity cost of the world market price.  
 
The  equilibrium  strategies  for  the  manufacturer  and  the  retailer  are  to  find  an 
agreement  in  order  to  be  able  to  sell  both  goods  on  the  domestic  market  and  enjoy  the 
monopoly  outcome.  This  monopoly  outcome  is  then  split  between  them  in  the  vertical 
structure according to their respective bargaining strength. Note here that an agreement is 
always found as the net surplus to be split is strictly positive. Therefore, the disagreement 
outcome  where  the  manufacturer  only  exports  and  the  retailer  only  imports  is  not 
implemented at the equilibrium. It is only a threat point for each agent in the negotiation, 
allowing them to secure some minimal profit. 
 
  We  now  analyze  the  effects  of  a  trade  policy  reform  on  the  domestic  economy. 
According  to  observed  facts,  such  a  policy  consists  in  lowering  the  import  tax  and/or  in 
increasing the non-tariff barriers, translating into less substitutatibility between products. The 
next  section  will  consider  the  impact  of  the  trade  policy  reforms  on  the  market,  and  its 
consequences on the agents’ profits. 
 
 
4. The effects of trade policy reforms 
 
  We first analyze the effects of a decrease in the import tax on each agent’s surplus. We 
then turn to the analysis of the impact of a modification of label requirements affecting the 
substitution  parameter.  Last,  we  look  at  how  these  different  trade  policy  tools  may  be 
combined to create a broad consensus among economic actors. 
 
4.1 Import tariff reform 
 
A decrease in the tax translates into a lower domestic good production and an increase 
in the quantity of the imported good. However, total quantity sold on the market rises because 
of a less harmful deadweight loss created by the taxation. 
                                                 
7 Note that demands are positive as soon as   <  ( ). 7 
 
Trade liberalization by lowering the import tariff has often been judged as welfare 
improving.  This  is  beneficial  because  it  stimulates  competition  across  firms  and  thus 
international trade may achieve an efficient allocation of production across countries. Besides, 
trade  liberalization  favors  product  diversity  for  consumers.  However,  in  our  framework, 
lowering the import tariff does not benefit the vertical structure surplus.  
 
Proposition  1.  Lowering  the  import  tariff  decreases  the  net  surplus  to  be  split  in  the 
negotiation between the manufacturer and the  retailer. The manufacturer will not benefit 
from a tariff decrease, whereas the retailer’s profit will increase. 
 
Proof:  





  ((1+ )(1− )+ (1+ ) − )
2(1− 
2) > 0   
  This derivative is always positive, indicating that the net surplus decreases when   is 
reduced. 
As  the  manufacturer’s  profit  is  defined  by    ∗( , ) =    ∗( , ) +
  
  ,  and 
  ∗( , ) is decreasing when   decreases,   ∗( , ) also decreases whatever his bargaining 
power.  
The retailer’s profit is:   ∗( ) = (1 −  )  ∗( ) +
 
 (1 +   −  (1 +  )) . So:  
∂  ∗( , )
∂  < 0				for				  <
(1+ − )(1− )(1+  )
 (1− 
2 )    
As     is  only  relevant  in  [0, ]  and  because 
    
      > 1,  we  have 
(     )(   )(    )
 (     ) >  . 
Therefore, the retailer’s profit is always increasing as long as   decreases in [0, ]. 
        ￿ 
 
Equation  (10)  summarizes  the  different  effects  of  a  tariff  decrease  in  the  vertical 
structure net surplus.  
(10)    (   
↓
)
   
↓
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↑
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↓
+      
↑
−  
(     ) 
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  The import tariff decrease lowers the price of the imported good and its demand rises. 
But since the price decreases at a lower rate than the cost of the imported good (see eq. (6)), 
the  retailer’s  margin  on  the  imported  good  thus  increases.  Therefore,  the  retailer’s  profit 
earned on the imported good increases.
8 Regarding the domestic product, a decrease in   
makes the domestic quantities sold by the manufacturer fall, and as the final price does not 
change, domestic sales decrease (see eq. (6) and (7)). Besides, as the manufacturer keeps his 
total production constant, the quantities he exports to the World market increase due to the 
loss in domestic demand. The last effect of the tariff decrease concerns the threat points of the 
manufacturer and the retailer, given in equation (2). Whereas the manufacturer’s reservation 
profit remains constant, the retailer has a higher disagreement pay-off as the imported good 
becomes cheaper.  
 
The retailer’s profit increases because the gain on his outside option overrides the 
lower share he gets from the vertical structure splitting. Indeed, the imported good becomes 
                                                 
8Profit on the imported good is defined by (   −  (1 +  )) ⋅   . 8 
cheaper and this plays to his advantage in the negotiation with the manufacturer. Conversely, 
the manufacturer’s loss is not compensated for by any modification of his reservation profit, 
and the reform therefore directly translates into a fall in the producer’s profits. 
 
  This conflict of interest in the vertical structure can shed some light on why producers 
are often reluctant about trade policy reform. In fact, their own incentives are clearly against 
trade liberalization as the retailer becomes more independent from their domestic production. 
This forces manufacturers to leave them more rents in order to find an agreement on the 
commercialization of the domestic good. Additionally, the trade policy reform fails to provide 
these two partners with a larger cake to split. 
  The domestic government may benefit or not from the trade policy reform, depending 
on  the  goal  it  wants  to  achieve.  Its  fiscal  revenues   ∗( )  are  maximum  for  a  level   ̃ =
(     )(   )
   <  . Therefore, if the initial tax rate is above  ̃, the decrease in the import tariff 
makes fiscal revenues higher, but if the initial tax rate is below  ̃ the domestic government 
loses on fiscal entries. Depending on the initial tax rate level, a government attentive to fiscal 
revenues may be reluctant to ratify a trade policy reform despite the increase in social welfare. 
 
4.2 Effect of non-tariff barriers 
 
  In previous decades, governments used to negotiate substantial import tax reductions 
whereas now, trade policy reforms mainly focus on the removal of ‘non-tariff barriers. For 
instance,  we  can  argue  that  the  standard  obtained  by  the  domestic  good  (such  as  a 
geographical indication) or weak compatibility between the domestic and the imported good 
is a non-tariff barrier  as advocated by  Marette and  Beghin [7]. This standard  allows the 
domestic good not to be considered at the same competition level as the imported one by 
consumers. In our framework, when the horizontal differentiation parameter ( ) decreases, 
the two goods become less and less of a substitute for the consumers. This can be interpreted 
as the result of higher consumer loyalty to the domestic standard. 
 
Proposition 2. When non tariff barriers increase, it results in a higher net surplus to be split 
in the vertical structure. The profits of the manufacturer and the retailer increase. 
 
Proof:   





 (t− )(t	 + )
2(1− 
2)
2 < 0				 ℎ  				0 <   <   
 
As  the  substitution  parameter  does  not  play  a  part  in  the  reservation  profits,  it  is 
straightforward that both   ∗ and   ∗ decrease with respect to  .             ￿ 
 
Equation (11) summarizes the different effects of an increase in NTBs (  decreases) in 
the vertical structure net surplus.  
(11)  NS(β  )
↓    
↑
= [p  − w(1 + t)]q             
↑
+ p q     
↑	  	     	
+ wq   
↓		  	               
↑	  	     
− c
(     ) 
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	where	ť =
   
    	t < t 
 
When the two products become more differentiated, the net surplus to be split in the 
vertical  structure  is  greater.  Both  agents  in  the  vertical  structure  are  thus  inclined  to  
strengthen non-tariff barriers. The reduced competition between goods resulting from the 
domestic standard enforcement drives up the  retailer’s profits on the imported  good. The 9 
revenue effect of total production (domestic and exports) depends on the level of the import 
tax. 
  The domestic government gains on fiscal revenues as   ∗ increases with NTBs. A 
policy aimed at the proliferation of NTBs is a way for the government to increase fiscal 
revenues all the easier since all agents in the economy will benefit from it. This result could 
explain why we observe the implementation of an increasing number of NTBs at national 
levels in high-income countries (see Beghin, [4] or Anders and Caswell, [1]). 
 
4.3 Coupled trade policy reform 
 
  In previous decades, trade policy reform consisted, principally, in negotiating inter-
state agreements on reducing tariff import taxes. However, this policy was not supported by 
local  manufacturers,  whereas  the  increase  in  NTBs  benefits  everyone  in  the  economy. 
Therefore, this may explain why governments reinforce NTBs in order to back up a targeted 
decrease in import taxes. The remaining question is to know whether there exists a coupled 
trade policy reform that makes everyone better off? 
 
Proposition  3.  There  exist  market  conditions  such  that  an  import  tax  decrease  and  an 
increase in NTBs are supported by every agent. 
 
Proof: The following table summarizes each agent’s profit variation according to the trade 
policy tool used. 
 
Agent  Decrease in 
the import tax	 
Increase in 
NTBs 
Decrease in import tax and 
increase in NTBs 
(	  ↓ 		   		  ↓ ) 




 ̅ −  
 	(1 −   )
 
Retailer  ↗  ↗  ↗ 
Consumers  ↗  ↗  ↗ 
Domestic 
State 
↘ if	initial	tax <  ̃	 




 ((1 −  ) ̅ +   )
(1 −   )( ̅ −  )
 
Social 
Welfare  ↗  ↗  ↗ 
Table 1. Variation in agents’ profits with respect to   and  . 
 
  One can see that if   
  
   >     
 ̅  
 	(    );
 ((   ) ̅   )
(    )( ̅  )  	, then a coupled trade policy is 
Pareto-improving since reluctance about the decrease in tariffs can always be compensated for 





  This model reveals the potential conflict of interest between upstream and downstream 
firms by taking into account the vertical structure which would have remained in the shadow 
otherwise. A trade policy aiming to decrease the import tax will favor the reserve profit the 
retailer secures in his negotiation with the manufacturer on the domestic good. Moreover, the 
development of NTBs has mainly been justified by the improvement in market efficiency 
such as  increased information on products in the case of labeling. Our model stresses the fact 
that, by strengthening the domestic standard, NTBs increase each agent’s interest. 
  Another conclusion is that governments wanting to implement targeted tariff decreases 
may also increase NTBs in order to gain manufacturers’ support and create a broad consensus 
within political forces. 
 
  There  are  however  limits  to  this  article’s  conclusions.  One  of  them  concerns 
downstream competition. In our framework, the retailer has a monopoly on both goods sold to 
consumers.  This  absence  of  competition  makes  the  NTBs  increase,  resulting  in  a  higher 
consumers’ surplus since the retailer perfectly internalizes interbrand substitutatibility (prices 
unchanged).  Taking  into  account  retailers’  competition  could  lead  to  higher  prices  when 
goods become less of a substitute, and thus to lower social welfare. It could jeopardize the 
broad consensus on the coupled policy trade reform. Moreover, it could also be thought that 
fiscal revenues may be used to pay for costly label implementation. A modification of the 
substitution parameter between products due to a strengthening of the domestic label may also 
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APPENDIX A  
Determination of the reservation profits 
 
When the manufacturer and the retailer do not find an agreement on the wholesale price and 
the franchise fee, the retailer only proposes the imported good to consumers. In this case, the 
demand for the imported good is given by:
9  
    (+∞,  ) = (1+ )−     
 
The manufacturer produces in order to equal marginal revenue to marginal cost, that is such 
that: 




This production gives him a reservation profit equal to:  




The retailer maximizes his profit: 
  (  ) = (   − (1+ ))⋅  (+∞,  ) 
 
This leads him to set the price of the imported good to:  
  ( ) =
1
2
 1+ + (1+ )  
achieving a reservation profit of     =
1
4(1+ − (1+ ))2. 
 
The domestic government, recovering the import taxes, gets a fiscal revenue equal to:  
  =  ⋅ ⋅   =
1
2  (1+ − (1+ )) 
This fiscal revenue is positive as long as   <	
   
   . 
 
                                                 
9 The ∞ symbol is used to denote the absence of the domestic good, as if the domestic good price was so high 
that  no  consumer  would  buy  it.  This  demand  is  found  by  replacing  in  (1)  the  price      by  the  limit  price 
cancelling the    domestic demand:    lim = (1 −  )(1 +  ) +    . 13 
APPENDIX B  
Cooperative Nash negotiation resolution 
 
The joint objective function to be maximized is the one of an axiomatic Nash framework, that 
is, the gross surplus removed from the retailer and manufacturer’s reserve profits. The net 
surplus to be maximized jointly is thus the one computed using equations (9) and (10). The 
program is:  
Max




(1 +   −  (1 +  ))  +   ⋅    −
 
2





This leads to the following equilibrium: 
  ∗( ) =
1
2(1+ + (1+ ))    and      ∗( , ) =




  ∗( ) =
1
2(1+ + )    and      ∗( , ) =

















The wholesale domestic price set by the manufacturer is fixed to the marginal cost, in order to 
avoid any quantity distortion within the domestic vertical structure. The total production of 
the  manufacturer  is  given  by    ∗ +   ∗ =
 
 .  Due  to  the  manufacturer’s  quadratic  cost 
structure, the marginal cost of the domestic product is, at the equilibrium: 
  ∗ =
∂ ⋅(   +  ∗)
∂   =  ⋅(   +  ∗) =   
 
The franchise fee   , paid by the retailer to the manufacturer, is then set to split the maximal 
equilibrium net surplus according to each agent bargaining power. It is defined such that:  
(   −  (1 +  )) ⋅   (  ,  ) + (   −   ) ⋅   (  ,  ) −    = (1 −  ) ⋅   ∗( , ) +
1
4
(1 +   −  (1 +  ))  
where   ∗( , ) =
(  (   )(   )  (   ) ) 
 (    ) . 